Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Ethiopia: a prerequisite for Democracy

©By De Birhan Media

10 September 2012

This is a comprehensive policy document, peace journalism and paper with 20 pages. De Birhan presents this paper as an olive branch for the new Ethiopian year 2005. This thesis argues that if the post Meles Zenawi leadership/administration is to call for a genuine “reconciliatory dialogue” with all concerned parties or at least wants to be a “democratic regime”; it must immediately start a comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR).

It also offers recommendations on how to go about implementing the Reform. SSR will absolutely play an enormous role in bringing a "relatively sustainable peace" to Ethiopia, and the Horn of Africa region. 

You can download and read the paper in a PDF format here  or simply here on our website. 

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Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Ethiopia: a prerequisite for Democracy

Ethiopia is entering a new era. A new era without Meles Zenawi, who ruled the nation for 21 years to the amusement of his clans, party members and Western allies and to the enormous disgruntlement of the majority of Ethiopians. It is also a new calendar year 2005.  It is a new era because, when Meles Zenawi departed, he left a regime, party, plan and policy that would only be energized and operational in his presence. He has built and left a security apparatus that is militarily “strong” but very weak in “leadership, accountability, transparency, inclusive representativeness”. Believing that democracy is a necessity for the peaceful and sovereign continuation of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region, Ethiopian and international stakeholders have been arguing that the Ethiopian security apparatus needed a “comprehensive and urgent reform”. This thesis argues that if the post Meles Zenawi leadership/administration is to call for a genuine “reconciliatory dialogue” with all concerned parties or at least wants to be a “democratic regime”; it must immediately start a comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR).

What is Security Sector Reform?

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee [OECD-DAC] (2007) report  broadly speaking, “the security sector is usually understood to  encompass all the organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use  of, force in order to protect communities, individuals, and the state.” These include the military, police, border guards, intelligence services, government bodies that monitor such organizations, and those institutions charged with upholding the rule of law, including the judiciary and the penal system. 

Hallelujah Lulie citing the OECD-DAC handbook wrote in his 2010 paper “The State of the Post 1991 Security Sector in Ethiopia; Challenges and Possible Entry Points for Reform” noting SSR is 

the transformation of the “security system” which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well functioning security framework.

Bendix and Stanley (2008) explain that SSR implies three principles:

• One of the novel aspects of SSR is that it is precisely not about piecemeal tinkering, but aims to achieve a broad reform of all dimensions of security provision, both with regard to (external) national defense and (internal) public security.
• Reform of the security sector is intended not simply to enhance the efficiency of the security forces, but to ensure that they conform to standards of legality, transparency and accountability
• SSR is concerned to have a positive impact not only on the security of the state (or that of the government of the day), but also on the security of communities and individuals, guaranteeing security provisions that are respectful of human rights and within the rule of law.

A program of the International Development Department, School of Public Policy University of Birmingham in its 2007 report entitled “A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform (SSR)” quoting the United Nations Security Council states that SSR “must be context-driven” and situational. The Report also attests that previously security was regarded as a mere political issue and has been avoided by development practitioners but since the end of the Cold War it is now believed that there is a two way linkage between security and development. 

Bendix and Stanley (2008) note conflicts have cost Africa US $ 18 billion per year since the end of the Cold War. Taking Sierra Leone as a case study, Bendix and Stanley (2008) attest that the SSR programme, mainly funded and managed by DFID, had the following objectives:  the creation of effective, affordable and democratically accountable security institutions; effective reconciliation, justice and reintegration of ex-combatants; and the reduction of regional threats to Sierra Leone. The SSR in Sierra Leone is cited as one of the “comprehensive “SSRs and “good practice” case. Akin to other African or international armies, the Ethiopian security sector was expected to be apolitical.

If we take the case of Bahrain “Many close observers of Bahrain have long noted that the security forces are, by design, heavily dominated by Sunni Muslims who are loyal to the Al Khalifa regime.” wrote  Kenneth Katzman  in an August 2012 article on Open Democracy titled Security Sector Reform in Bahrain.  Following over reactions in 2010/11 on peaceful protesters by the security, an Independent Commission made the following recommendations to “correct the longstanding security sector imbalances and deficiencies”. According to Kenneth some of them were:

·                 

•  Integrating Shiites into the security services to a far greater degree.
• Taking away the National Security Agency’s (intelligence service) law enforcement powers.
• Introducing greater transparency into the arrest and interrogation process.
• Instituting a “code of conduct,” based on international best practices, so that the security services adhere to international standards of human rights practices.
• Abolishing the military court system and transfer of all cases to ordinary courts.

Although the laws were in place, it did not fully keep the security from acting on the peaceful protesters. SSR may not be easily and suddenly internalized in a security that is transforming from in an ethnicised and monopolized hegemony.

Similarly, the second most controversial issue was the sale of arms and military training to the Bahraini government by the U.S. government which was stopped and later resumed. Such intergovernmental relations put the SSR not on an impossible endeavor but difficult one.  A very popular criticism on SSR worldwide has been that most donor states that were involved in the Reform process were rather “excessively arming and training” the security of developing countries that enabled the latter to consolidate their hold on power and repressiveness.  

SSR emphasis on participation, transparency, accountability and the provision of security for all within the rule of law, make it an approach that should transcend the more narrow concerns of traditional military and police assistance.

SSR in Ethiopia

In the case of Ethiopia the little SSR attempt was a project on “Ethiopia Implementation of military pillar of SSR; defense transformation” funded by the United Kingdom (UK) government, according to (Bendix and Stanley, 2008). The process has however been not comprehensive and there has been little information on the process and its achievements.  SSR in the Ethiopian case has been reduced to the army and was mainly focused on training. Some argue that the short project rather empowered the security instead of taming it. According to Hallelujah “… strong criticisms were forwarded on the way the army reacted to the TPLF split in 2001 and the national election in 2005. The two incidents seriously compromised its independence enhancing the already existed strong popular belief that the army is not apolitical.” 

Defense Forces

The current Ethiopian Constitution article 87, states “the armed forces shall at all times obey and respect the constitution” and section 87/5 of the same constitution stresses “the armed forces shall carry out their functions free of any partisanship to any political organization(s)”. The security history of the past 21 years of Ethiopia which has been dominated by members and leadership of one ethnic member was a complete opposite of the constitution in that armed forces in most cases didn’t obey and respect the constitution, the Ethiopian security sector carried out its functions with partisanship to the ruling EPRDF party.

In 2009 the Ethiopian political Movement, Ginbot 7 published an extensive list of the top commanders of the current Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) including their names, their position in the military and their ethnic background which showed that “some 95% of the top brass of the military emanate from the Tigrian ethnic group representing about 6% of the population.” While Hallelujah in his 2010 paper argues “Though it is difficult to find the exact figure more than 80 percent of key posts in the army are believed held by former TPLF fighters from one ethnic group.”  These officers are also members of the ruling party.

The tabular list below complied by the Movement in 2009 demonstrates the names, ranks and ethnic backgrounds of the top leadership of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF).

High Ranking Military Officials Principal Defense Departments (EPRDF)

No	Job Division	Name & Rank	Ethnic Group
1	Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff	General Smora Yenus	Tigre
2	Armed Forces Head of Training	Lt.General Tadesse Worde	Tigre
3	Head of Logistics	Lt.General Gezae Abera	Tigre
4	Head of Intelligence	Br. General Gebre Dela	Tigre
5	Armed Forces Head of Campaign	Major General Gebreegzher	Tigre
6	Armed Forces Head of Engineering	Lt.General Berhane Negash	Tigre
7	Chief of the Air Force	Brg. General Mola Haile Mariam	Tigre
8	Northern Command	Lt. General Seare Mekonnen	Tigre
9	South Eastern Command	Maj. General Abraha W. Gabriel	Tigre
10	Western Command	Brg. General Siyoum Hagos	Tigre

Compiled by Ginbot 7 Movement in 2009

In this 95% one ethnic controlled Defense, of the  top 61 positions, there are only 2 from Agew and 2 from the Amahra ethnic groups who hold top positions while the rest 57 them are all Tigre. This diversity has not changed as of yet except that finger counted officers from minority ethnic groups have been promoted and 13 Generals and 303 Colonels have been replaced in December 2011 however it has been symbolic. The ethnic composition has been the same within the other security sectors as well, that we would broach later.

After assessing the ethnic composition of the Ethiopian Defense, doing a comparative analysis of other African cases fulfils this journey. For this analysis, De Birhan chose the Kenyan Army. Kenya, Ethiopia’s neighbor shares a lot of political, military, historical, economic and cultural commonalities. The Kenyan Defense Force is one of the strongest in East Africa and actively takes part in regional security programs as its Ethiopian counterpart. What does the ethnic/tribal composition of Kenyan Defense Forces look like?

Kenyan Defense Forces leadership and their Ethnic Composition

	Name and Rank	Position	Ethnic group/Tribe
1	Gen. Julius Karangi	Chief of Defense Forces	Kikuyu
2	General Kianga	Chairman of the Kenya Railways Corporation	Kamba
3	Maj Gen S. J Mwathathe	Vice Chief of Defense Forces	Mijikenda
4	Brig P. W. Kameru	Director of Military Intelligence	Unknown
5	Brig. N. Mukala	Commander Kenya Navy	Luhya
6	Brigadier J. M. Waweru	Deputy Commander of Kenya Army	Kikuyu
7	Lt. Gen J. Kasaon	Kenya Army's Commander	Kalenjin
8	Lt Gen N. Mwaniki	Commandant of National Defense College	Kikuyu
9	Maj. Gen J. Otieno	Commander of Kenya Air Force	Luo
10	Maj. Gen. H.M. Tangai	Senior Directing Staff - National Defense College	Unknown

Complied by De Birhan, September 2012

As can be viewed in the above two tables while the Ethiopian Defense Force is fully dominated by a leadership that comes from one ethnic group, the Kenyan Defense Force on the other hand, is composed of a leadership who hail from at least seven ethnic/tribal backgrounds. The above samples serve as representatives of the whole army leadership in both cases. Leadership balance and equality is one of the main core areas of a modern democratic army and core principle of the SSR. The Kenyan Defense Force shows a proper leadership balance and equality while the Ethiopian army shows a monopoly. This monopoly is also exhibited in the rest of the security apparatuses such as the intelligence, prisons, police and courts. Similarly, the Ethiopian Defense has no e-presence and it is very difficult to find an official Website of the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense or is poorly resourced and updated. In the case of Kenya, the Official Website of the Kenyan Ministry of Defense (http://www.mod.go.ke/) is updated daily and well resourced with the necessary information. One of the goals of SSR is gender balance in the Sector. The Kenyan army is successful with this aspect too, according to the MOD website “In the Kenya Army, Women traverse the whole spectrum of careers including drivers, mechanical and electrical engineering, communications technicians, clerks, accountants, military police women, lawyers and Infantry .”  In terms of civilian control and leadership, even though the Ministry is ministered by a civilian and is accounted by parliamentary standing committees, the fact that the military officers enjoy much power and the domination of the parliament by members of the ruling party makes the participation, democratization and civilian administration of the Defense ineffectual.

The ENDF has been mentioned in various reports for executing extrajudicial killings, killing peaceful protesters and mainly for being an instrument if the ruling party and the regime. A report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) on August 2012 stated that the Ethiopian military “commits arbitrary arrests, rape, and other abuses against scores of local villagers” particularly in April 2012 the Southern region of the country, Gambella. 

In addition to the killing of over 200 civilians in the post 2005 election crackdown, the other most recent and noted torture and atrocity by the Ethiopian security was the one that was committed on those arrested in 2009 charged for attempting coup in alliance with the Ginbot 7 Movement.  The arrested army members and civilians spoke in Court that their testicles were beaten, most castrated, their ears deafened and eyes blinded by the Ethiopian security operators.  However, the Ethiopian Defense Forces have also been positively contributing in regional peace keeping efforts, national developmental missions and other emergencies. The partisanship of the army to the ruling party than the Ethiopian Constitution and the people is one of the major reasons that it is critiqued for, Merara Gudina, a political scientist and opposition leader, was quoted in Hallelujah’s 2010 paper as saying “the security institutions have been servants of the ruling party since 1991.”  Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT) had reported that the Ethiopian generals and most officers are swallowed up in deep corruption with some of the generals owning multimillion worth buildings in Addis Abeba, being board members of most governmental Corporations and ministries.

Intelligence

Ethiopian Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) leadership composition unlike its Kenyan counterpart is unknown. However De Birhan team’s investigation found this out :  Getachew Assefa, a former guerilla fighter, relative a closest ally of the late Prime Minister Meles, member of the ruling party heads NISS. NISS has two broad branches. The first one is Internal Intelligence Head Department, Headed by Mr. Yared and External Intelligence Head Department headed by Isayas Woldegiorgis. Both of them are Tigreans, members of the ruling Party and former fighters. The Intelligence is composed of 80% one ethnic members: Tigrean.  Another cognate Agency is the Ethiopian Information Network Security Agency (INSA) whose ultramodern headquarters is being built at a cost of 100 million Br presents its goals as “enable the country effectively utilize information, information network and telecommunication services in implanting peace and democracy, and implementing development strategies without any risk to the national security”. The Agency with most of its young staffers now sent to Europe and the U.S. for higher studies is mainly engaged at spying Ethiopians on the cyber sphere. It also blocks and bans websites, blogs and other media that are critical of the government.  Brigadier General Teklebirhan Welde Aregay, is the Director General of Ethiopian Information Network Security Agency (INSA) is also a member of the Defense Forces, Tigrean ethnic and former guerilla fighter.  The accountability, transparency and leadership of the two agencies are also anti constitutional and corrupt.   It is unclear and there has been no evidence if the Agencies are accountable to any organ. According to sources they are directly accountable to the Prime Minister. These two agencies must be participative, democratic, transparent, and accountable and led by civilians.

Police

The Ethiopian police system consists of a Federal Police Service, nine Regional Police forces and the police forces of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, which have a special position and the Federal Police Commissioner is under the Ministry of Federal Affairs.  Federal Police Commission; Workneh Gebeyehu (Commissioner), Deputy Director General Hassen Shiffa, and another official Tuemay Aregawi are all members of the ruling party, non civilian, regime affiliates and ethnic members of the ruling TPLF. The Addis Abeba Police Commission Commissioner, Yehdego Seyoum was also a former guerilla fighter of the TPLF and is member of the Front. Deputy Commissioner of Addis Ababa Police Commission, Girma Kasa is also member of the ruling party and hails from the Tigrean ethnic group as well. Although the Legal and Administrative Affairs Standing Committee  and other Committees of the Addis Abeba City Council are supposed to watching, and accounting the performances of the Commission, the impartiality and strength of the Committee is doubtable because over 99% of the City Council members as in the National Parliament, are also members and candidates of the ruling EPRDF.

Werekneh Gebeyehu, the Director of the infamous Ethiopian Federal Police was watched on the National TV attending a closed meeting of the Executive Committee of the ruling EPRDF last week (04 September 2012) in Addis Abeba.

A glance at the ethnic diversity of the Kenyan police force shows that they all hail from different ethnic backgrounds. Major General Michael Gichangi of the Kenyan National Security Intelligence Service, Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere, Administration Police Commandant, Kinuthia Mbugua, Criminal Investigations Department Director, Ndegwa Muhoro, Director of National Police Operations, Julius Ndegwa, and Japheth Mwania, who heads the National Youth Service all come from different ethnic groups such as Luo, Kikuyu, kamba and Mijikenda.

Regarding police accountability the 2005 Holland based Center for International Legal Cooperation (CILC) Report asserted “Police must be subject to the rule of law and accountable for their actions” and recommended the following measures:

• Police should adopt and enforce a Code of Conduct (Ethics).

• Establish a clear policy on the use of force, which advocates alternatives to the use of force and restricts the use of firearms.

• An independent body should be established to handle complaints against police.

Courts/Prisons

Article 81 of the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution states that the President and Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court are nominated by the Prime Minister and the Federal and State Supreme Courts “have the highest and final jurisdiction over federal matters” and their accountability is not clearly stated in the Constitution. If the Prime Minister nominates these judges in a non political, objective and merit-based manner, the non-politicization, non-corruption and independence of the judiciary may be  guaranteed. However,   the Ethiopian judiciary scenario, especially that of the Federal Supreme Court, is partisan and non-independent and ethnicsised.

The justice system (judiciary, penitentiary and prosecutor) is also headed and dominated by staffers who were either part of the military struggle that overthrew the previous regime or members of the ruling party and members of one ethnic group: Tigray. Dr. Menberetsehai Tadesse, former Supreme Court Judge, then Deputy President of the Federal Supreme Court and now the Director General of the Justice and Legal System Research Institute at a Ministerial Portfolio, has been a close ally of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and hails from the same ethnic group as him as Fasil Nahom, the late PM’s Justice Affairs advisor. An investigation by  De Birhan about the ethnic backgrounds of the Federal Supreme Court judges shows the same ethnic slenderness  as in the other Security Sectors of the country.

Full Name	Role	Ethnic Background
Hagos Woldu	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Tigre
Mesfin Equbeyohannes	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Tigre
Medhin Kiros	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Tigre
Teshager Gebresellasie	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Tigre
Fisseha Workneh	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Tigre
Menberetsehaye Tadese	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Tigre
Desta Gebru	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Tigre
Ali Mohammed	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Unknown
Dagne Melaku	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Amhara
Alemaw Welle	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Mixed ethnic
Sultan Abatemam	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Unknown
Hirut Melese	Federal Supreme Court Judge	Mixed ethnic
Desalegn Berhe,	Federal First Instance Court; President	Tigre

Ethnic composition of Ethiopian Federal Supreme Court, Compiled by De Birhan, Sep. 2012

Holland based Center for International Legal Cooperation (CILC) conducted a baseline study titled “Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program of Ethiopia” in 2005 for the Ministry of Capacity Building Justice System Reform Program Office. The study concluded that the Ethiopian justice system had three core problems:

Firstly, it is neither accessible nor responsive to the needs of the poor. Secondly, serious steps to tackle corruption, abuse of power and political interference in the administration of justice have yet to be taken. Thirdly, inadequate funding of the justice institutions aggravates most deficiencies of the administration of justice.            

As part and means of the Reform process the Report then recommends that “The Powers vested in the function of the President of the Federal and States Supreme Courts should be transferred to the Judicial Administration Commissions”. Like the rest of the recommendations, it has not been implemented hitherto. It also recommended that courts and accountability of judges should be increased in addition to “regularized, objective, merit-based and transparent for administrating judge’s career paths”.

The CILC report further adds that court presidents are in charge of the operations of courts meaning that they are both professional judges and administrators at the same time putting their independence in question.

Regarding the prison police in Ethiopia, the CILC Report states that they are not part of the regular police and that they receive a different kind of training.  Even though the Federal Prison Administration is accountable to the Ministry of Federal Affairs while the State Prison Administration is accountable to the State Justice Bureau, according to CLIC (2005) report “On national level, no independent watchdog exists”.  It asserts that there should be a Reform in the manner in which Federal Prosecutors which are accountable to the Executive part of the regime and prison administration should be improved as well as changes in “attitude and philosophies” of those working in corrections. CILC also recommended that “use of force and carrying of weapons by prison staff should be strictly limited and regulated” however it was only last week that Zerihun Gebregziabher the chairman of the [opposition] Ethiopian National Democratic Party (ENDP) was reportedly beaten in the prison cell last month for mocking the news of the death of the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Similarity, Andualem Arage, the official of the opposition Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) was “severely beaten by a cellmate under the orders of Prison Officials”. A similar investigation by De Birhan found out that most prisons in the country are administered by former guerilla fighters, members of the ruling party and non civilian officers who hail from one ethnic group. Our assessment concludes that the Ethiopian penitentiary is corrupt, non-transparent, non participatory, less accountable and mal-administrated.

Unsuccessful vision

G/Tsadkan Gebretensae formerly Lieutenant General was a ‘’liberation fighter’’ with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), first as a rank and file fighter and rose through the ranks to be a senior member of the TPLF leadership. During the armed struggle for over 15 years, he played a crucial role in building and commanding the TPLF army, until his transition to the position of Chief of the General Staff of the new Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) from 1991 to 2001. Since 2002 in a row that occurred within the party, his military recognition was removed by Meles Zenawi. On a symposium conducted on “ the Making of The New Ethiopian Constitution ''  from 17-21 May 1993 in Addis Abeba , General Tsadkan Gebretensae then Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia had this compellingly smart vision of an Ethiopian army, “The purpose of the national army must be defined by the constitution. The future national army cannot be an instrument to suppress internal political dissent or to resolve political problems, within Ethiopia, that should be resolved politically and democratically. ” To defend the constitution, the army must know and understand the principles and articles that the constitution upholds, he had viewed.

On the command of the army, Tsadkan said “the highest legislative authority in the country must determine the size, structure and budget of the army if civilian control of the armed forces is to be guaranteed” and “accountable to civilian authorities in the execution of its mission” with a broader representativeness of the Ethiopian society. In order to have all representative and inclusive army he had said “it will be necessary to demobilize many Tigrian members of the armed forces and to re-shape the army to reflect the participation of all nations and nationalities.”   Tsadkan wrote this vision in 1993 while the discourse of SSR was at its nascent, before he was able to fully realize his vision; Tsadkan was sadly demobilized with his ranks removed.

One most recent example of SSR in Africa is Egypt; the act of Mohammed Mursi since his election. On Sep.2, 2012 he retired seventy generals in the Egyptian armed forces. The President also replaced the defense minister and the chief of staff weeks after his election. Leadership change, diversity, gender balance are some of the cores of SSR.

The Ethiopian security apparatus and mainly the military should be strengthened and be logistically upgraded with cross cutting technology. Its strength is the peace, safety and national security of our country. However, this bona fide may be short living due to its inability to make reforms. Although the Sector is technologically, financially and human resource wise firm, its accountability, administration, transparency and leadership could hugely cost what has been built throughout.

According to Jeffrey Isima’s 2003 paper entitled Report on the current position with regard to the Security Sector in Ethiopia,  

The current Constitution provides ample mechanisms for a democratic oversight of the military by civil authority. The parliament has a standing committee that oversees defense and security affairs, and ensures parliamentary control on defense policy and decisions such as organization and structure of the Armed Forces, recruitment, promotion and discipline.

Nevertheless, there is a huge difference between the policy and practice. Although the Constitution guarantees and stipulates that practically there is no parliamentary control on defense policy and decisions. It has always come from the Prime Minister and was adopted by the Parliament. One Party dominated Parliament is unable to challenge and rule out recruitment, promotion and discipline plans, policies, oversight and decisional issues that come from the Executive.

Key Challenges and Opportunities for SSR in Ethiopia

Challenges	Opportunities
Most of the Security and Political actors don’t see a need for SSR	The coming of the new leadership could also open up opportunities for all kinds of reform but mainly SSR
Power struggle and power transition could obscure the necessity of SSR at the moment	Donor readiness and willingness to support and assist SSR
The Parliamentary, Party and Security members uniformity could challenge	If the SSR starts and is implemented, it opens the door for national reconciliation and dialogue
Fear for any kind of change within all levels of leadership	Regional geopolitical and globalization developments
May be time taking, intensive and costly	International and local support with room for wide local ownership

Horn of Africa analysts Medhane Tadesse interviewed by Hallelujah for the same Paper said “Security systems are at the heart of the political process in the region, but efforts to reform them have proved to be extremely difficult.”

Conclusion

From our analysis it can be concluded that the Ethiopian security sector has been there to protect the security and perpetuation of the regime. Unlike its mission and duties it has not stood and protected the Constitution or the people.  SSR is about civilian control, transparency, participatoryness, accountability, ethnic and leadership integration, gender balance, democraticness, conformity to the legality, and securing human rights. None of these SSR core principles have been applied or started within the Ethiopian security. The Ethiopian security sector has rather not been transparent, apolitical, under civilian control, accountable, ethnically and leadership diversified, democratic, conforming to the law and securing human rights. The theoretical analysis demonstrated that there is a two way relationship between security and development. The incumbent in Ethiopia is unlike other times dedicated to “developed and transform the country economically”. This cannot happen in the absence of a reformed security. The current Ethiopian security with a Western training and assistance might seem “stable and perpetual”, however, as to the above analysis, without an immediate and comprehensive Security Sector Reform, it will totally cave in. The experiences and case studies of many armies that reform their securities ended up badly or did not progress economically. Noting the Balkans is appropriate here. The Reform would lead to an all inclusive, national reconciliation dialogue, which is badly needed for the stability, peace and continuity of the country and region. Secondly, even if the regime doesn’t want negotiation and dialogue for peace at all, the fact that it Reforms this sector boosts its democratic credentials, more aid, relatively perpetual peace, development and security.

Hallegujah (2010) argues that in addition to high level political commitment in the EPRDF, the Sector needs cultural and human transformation in the,

Composition of the institution with regard to its ethnic, and regional and gender composition and its human resource practices especially in the top offices. At the end there should be a strong, legitimate and independent as well as effective mechanism to ensure assessments, monitoring, and review and evaluation process and apply flexible support maintaining clarity of objectives.

Jeffrey Isima’s 2003 paper on the other hand stresses that civil society could play an important role in encouraging the state to fulfill its responsibilities transparently and accountably. This can be through a range of functions including advocacy, monitoring, policy support and service delivery, says the Report.

Recommendations:

·   Starting a SSR discourse between the security and the people. This can be facilitated by the media and think tanks. Academic institution and other forum can also entertain this discourse and carpet the way for the practice.

· Integrate SSR within the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). Although mainly of economic focus, the 5 year GTP has social and political plans within it. It is not too late to integrate the SSR plan within the grand Plan too.

· Overhaul the Election Board or change its relationship and linkage with the security.

·  Establish an independent National Security Council which will be composed of government officials, security personnel, elected civil societies members, elected media professionals, elected think thanks members and veterans and elders who would monitor the accountability, transparency and fairness of the security sector. This Council would help in continuation the Ethiopian national security even after regimes fall down, demobilization or change. The Security should serve the people and the country and should never be liquidated or reestablished as regimes change.

·  All security sectors should totally reform their ethnic monopoly and integrate members of all ethnic groups especially in leadership positions.

·  All security sector personnel should continuously be trained by think tanks and international trainers about democracy, respect of the law and human rights.

·  All security sectors mainly the Police, Intelligence and Defense should have a common Code of Conduct and make it public and should adhere to it.

·  Prisons should be administered by civilians and human rights of prisoner should be respected as well as the prison conditions. Regular visits by independent bodies should be developed.

·  There should be clear boundary and separation between the security sector and Executive/political organs of the State. Care should be taken in the appointment of leadership of the sector. The leadership as much as possible might not be the same in ethnicity, religion, political opinion and relationship with the leadership of the Executive body.

·   Finally but not least a National Reconciliation Commission can be established by independent organs. The existing Elder’s Group can compose one or change itself into a Commission. The Commission would then start an all inclusive, cross-sectionally comprehensive national dialogue and reconciliation process. The Commission could also suggest, or facilitate the SSR. Similarly, encouraging and developing peace journalism would contribute to this effort immensely.

References

• A Beginner’s Guide to Security Sector Reform (SSR) (2007), GFN-SSR, International Development Department, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom
• Bendix, Daniel and Stanley, Ruth  (2008)  Security Sector Reform in Africa: The Promise and the Practice of a New Donor Approach, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
• Isima, Jeffrey (2003) Report on the current position  with regard to the  Security Sector in Ethiopia, GFN-SSR, Cranfield University, UK
• Katzman,  Kenneth (2012) Security Sector Reform in Bahrain, Open Democracy
• Lulie,  Hallelujah (2010) “The State of the Post 1991 Security Sector in Ethiopia; Challenges and Possible Entry Points for Reform”, a paper presented at an Expert Meeting on Regional Security Policy: Security Sector Reform (SSR), Addis Abeba, Draft
• Gebretensaie Tsadkan (1993)  Making of The New Ethiopian Constitution, Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia
• Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Comprehensive Justice System Reform Program (2005), Ministry of Capacity Building Justice System Reform Program Office, Center for International Legal Cooperation, The Netherlands

©By De Birhan Media  September 10, 2012