ADDIS ABABA - Sebhat Gebregzabher, a journalist and
novelist known for his eccentric lifestyle and yet adored in literary
circles as the 'father of short-story writing' died in Addis Ababa on
Monday. He was 76.
Sebhat's golden days were during the emperor's
time, when he was a flamboyant handsome journalist whose very popular
weekly columns appeared in Menen, a magazine named after the wife
of Emperor Haileselassie. In the late '60s and early '70s, he was being
schooled in France, where he said he was widely exposed and influenced
by the works of great literary figures such as French writer Émile Zola.
His novel in Amharic, Letoom Aynegalign, was translated and published in French while he was living in Paris.
During the military regime (1974-1991), Sebhat was chief
editor at then state-owned Kuraz Publishing Agency. There at Kuraz,
Sebhat and a few others were ordered by the military regime to translate
Das Kapital, the masterpiece of Karl Marx. They complied and translated the monumental book of Marxists into Amharic.
After Kuraz, Sebhat moved to Arat Kilo's
Berhanena Selam Printing Press, where he was writing weekly columns for
the Amharic daily Addis Zemen while doubling as editor for the English daily The Ethiopian Herald.
His early manuscripts that he wrote after he returned
from France were never published because of their sexually explicit
nature.
Nevertheless, his newspaper columns continued to be very
popular as they were standing out for being short and entertaining. In
literary circles, Sebhat was unofficially adored as the 'father of short
story writing.' He had a great admirer as well. Novelist Ba'alu Girma,
who was murdered mysteriously in the late '80s by the Derg military
regime for his fictional work Oromai, honored Sebhat by writing a biographical novel that he named Deraseew (The Novelist).
A native of the historic town of Adwa in northern Ethiopia, Sebhat's published works include Tekusat, Säbatägnaw Mälak, Egrä Mängäd, Mastawäsha, and Amist-Sidist-Sebat, among others.
A stern face with piercing eyes may portray Sebhat as an
aggressive and trouble-seeking man, but for those who closely know the
novelist, he was extremely humble and generous that at one time he
shared his home with about a dozen homeless children. He is survived by
two sons and three daughters.
Some Ethiopian opponents are convinced that the United States may have already begun to discuss the succession of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.
The United States has already reportedly begun to check two options for what could follow after Prime Minister Meles Zenawi:
He could either rapidly designate his own successor to prepare him for his role, or He could establish government of national unity before the end of his term.
Such is the belief of Ethiopian opponents who have had contacts with American diplomats in Addis Ababa or in Washington. These diplomats have had talks with the faction of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) headed by Kemal Gelchu, with the Ginbot 7 group led by Dr. Berhanu Nega and with Daoud Ibsa, the leader of another faction of the OLF who was discreetly invited toWashington at the end of last year.
Several economic (higher inflation, rampant corruption) and political (the recent sidelining of 300 officers including Tigrayan generals) factors have led the U.S. officials to deem that Ethiopia is not immune to uncontrolled social explosions, even if the EPRDF governing coalition has the situation well in hand. Hence the idea that Meles Zenawi take the initiative to open his government to some opponents such as Birtukan Mideksa or Seye Abraha, who are currently undergoing training at Harvard University.
Failing that, the U.S. delegates reportedly suggested that Meles Zenawi should plan the period after he is no longer in power and prepare his successor, whether it be Tewodros Adhanom the current minister of health, Arkebe Oqubay (advisor to the Prime Minister) or former Chief of Staffof the Ethiopian army, the former General Tsadkan Gebre-Tensae who now works for the UN in South Sudan. But Meles Zenawi is not believed to have favoured either scenario.
A friend just came back from a holiday in Addis
Abeba. He spoke of the “new Addis” highly. He said the sky rocketing building
for hotels, malls and multipurpose complexes is unbelievable. Unlike old times
you can find Western standard resorts, hotels and pubs. He told me how extravagantly
posh Addis Abeba has become. Well and good. To tell you the truth am sick and tired
of such people who are in psychological denial of the real face of Addis; the
slums. 80 percentof the country's urban populationlive in slums, according to
UNHABITAT’s 2006 study. Why cannot our eyes see the poor,
slums?
Slum in Addis Abeba
This study explores slums theoretically and broaches
the slums of Addis Abeba via a literature review. It also looks at the linkage of slums with popular revolutions. The word slum has a history of over two
centuries. According to Khurana (2004), the word slum, originated from the word
slumber, which meant "a sleepy back alley" or ‘wet mire' where working class housing was
built during British Industrial revolution in order to be near the factories.
Similarly, Collins English Dictionary (2007) defines a slum as a poor rundown
overpopulated section of a city while the UN HABITAT (2003) report
operationally defines a slum as "a heavily populated urban area
characterized by substandard housing and squalor.” UNECA (1968) defines urban localities based on
spatial measurements thus areas with more than 20,000 people and cities with
more than 100,000 people.
--
Slums
happen and can also be perpetuated by a number of things, including rapid
rural-to-urban migration, increasing urban poverty and inequality, insecure
tenure, conflict and wrong policies and globalization (UNHABITAT,
2003). Davis (2004) takes “bad governance”, neoliberalism policies, especially
the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) as the major causes and perpetrators
of slums in the world. He says, the directions of both national and
international interventions during the last twenty years have actually
increased urban poverty and slums, increased exclusion and inequality, and
weakened urban elites in their efforts to use cities as engines of growth. UNHABITAT
(2008) report argues, conflict and insecurity are two of the major causes of
slum formation. According to the report, as conflicts arise and propagate the
insecurity of the urban areas doubles. Slums and urban areas have become the
safe havens of criminals, fundamentalists, and insurgents. This exponential growth
of slums makes slums the dwelling place of many in hiding.
Most urban theories spin around
space, history, and politico-economic make up of slums. Marshal (1966) states that
theoretically slums are considered as results of huge industrial expansion and
modernisation that prop up other less to do residents to infiltrate cities and
urban areas hence creating slums.
Slums have functions: For some employers slums have been useful as
places where employees could live at lower rentals and therefore, on lower
incomes (Marshal, 1966). He lists some of the functions of slums such as providing
housing for the lowest income groups in society, serving as places where group
living and associations based on villages, regions, tribes, or ethnic or racial
groups may develop. An important function of the slum is that of offering a
place of residence to those who prefer to live anonymously. Despite the negativity
attached to them, slums continue to affect the socioeconomic livelihood and
interaction of those within the slums and outside of them positively (Marshal, 1966). In general, slums
assist migrants and people coming from rural areas in offering them a
residence, jobs, and livelihoods.
Livelihoods: Walter Cordoba, 36 years old, from
Santiago de Chile, quoted on UNHABITAT (2003) report describes livelihood
in slums saying, “People identify themselves with the area and commit
themselves to the place but, they have no aspirations, there is no way to show
their children that there could be another way of living.” Azalea (2010)
describes livelihood in slums as ‘intolerable’. The livelihood is filled with
stories of diseases, personal and property insecurity, dilapidated
infrastructure, ‘victimisation’ (UNHABITAT, 2003). Khurana (2004) writing
from an Indian slum point of view says that slums generally lack ventilation,
formation, building space, sanitation and minimum environmental health standards.
Slum Typology
Most writers give location-based definitions to
slums in studying their typologies. Agnihotri (1994) asserts that slum was a
distinctive phenomenon in urban geography requiring location-based definition. He
categorises two types of slums: inner-city slums (slums found within cities
centres), and peripheral slums (slums located outside the capital or city
centres). Alternatively, UNHABITAT (2003) report sections slums as
central, scattered slum islands and peripheral. In terms of size UNHABITAT
(2003) divides, slums size wise into three: 1) Large slum settlements 2)
Medium-sized slum estates 3) Small slums (which are scattered throughout the
world). Aware of the immense differences
of slums in developed and developing counties, Davis (2006) on his
part offers two major slum typologies: Metro Core and Periphery.
Slums in Ethiopia
The
Times of India today (16-2-2012) reported that a delegation from
Ethiopia, comprising representatives of government and non-government
organizations, visited the state capital on Wednesday to understand the
Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation's slum improvement policies. The eight-member
African delegation are also scheduled to visit slums like Salia Sahi and Gyana
Nagar, to have a first-hand experience of the facilities provided by the local
civic body to slum dwellers. " BMC slum improvement officer Srimant Mishra
saidEthiopiawould
soon start a project called "health for urban poor".
“Unlike the colonial cities of Africa, Addis Abeba was
built by Ethiopians: Italians had very little contribution to its creation and
growth. Though TPLF scholars refer to it as a garrison town of Menelik, the
poor and the rich lived together.” Said Miriam Cheru in a 2010 piece
that appeared on Abugidainfo.
An
Addis Ababa government official notes that around one-quarter of all units are
owned by local authorities and rented out at rates that have been frozen since
July 1975, vastly reducing the potential for income that can be pumped back
into housing improvements. "The government also believes in privatization
of public houses," said the official. Through such projects, we can
alleviate slums and informal settlements," he added.
But let's parse this. Three-quarters
of the units are not owned by local authorities and are not rented out at
subsidized rates. Yet those units, too, have apparently not improved.” another
blogger recounts in a 2007 blog entry.
One of the latest and extensive resources on slums in Ethiopia is UNHABITAT’s 2006 research
called “Situation Analysis of Slums settlements
in Addis Ababa”. So, I will take some chunks from the paper to corraborate our look of Ethiopian slums from a historical and analytical take.
The Report says the earliest known display of government interest in influencing the spatial
organization of urban life in 20th century Ethiopia dates back to a 1907
proclamation whereby private ownership of urban land became legal in Addis
Ababa. Another important historical landmark that deserves mentioning while
discussing government responses to urban housing needs in Ethiopia is the
difficulties that cities like Addis Ababa have been facing in connection with
the short-lived Italian occupation of 1936 to 1941. A few days before the city
fell into the hands of the Italian army, patriotic forces destroyed many
buildings on purpose, mainly by setting them on fire. On top of that, the
production of new dwellings temporarily stopped because the Italians, shortly
upon arriving in the city, issued proclamations that forbade “the repair of
existing buildings or the erection of new constructions...until further notice”.
Because of these developments, Addis Ababa faced what seemed to be its first
major housing shortage (Bahiru, 1987; Pankhurst, 1987). Furthermore, although
they developed the first meaningful – if colonial – master plan for the city,
the Italians had no labor policy or housing strategy that could have kept rural
to urban migration in check. As a result, the population of the city doubled
during the five years of Italian occupation. Although they had plans to erect
new residential buildings, ostensibly to accommodate incoming Italian settlers,
the occupants failed to achieve even 20 per cent of what they anticipated. The
net result of all this is that by the time Italian occupation ended, Addis
Ababa was faced with a huge unmet housing demand.
Accoring to UNHABIAT(2006), the
famous British planner, Sir Patrick Abercrombie, devised the earliest
post-liberation master plan of Addis Ababa in 1956. In 1959, Bolton Hennessy
and Partners put out a second post-liberation master plan for Addis Ababa. Addis
Ababa was yet to see three further master plans. It fell to the French
architect L. de Marien to propose the last pre-1974 scheme, in 1965. However,
like all of its predecessors, this plan focused on physical embellishment and
disregarded the pressing social and economic problems of the city. Indeed this
shortcoming was characteristic of all of the master plans prepared by one
Italian firm for several other Ethiopian towns in the 1960s.
Let's take a break watching Pussycat Dolls' "Jai Ho" music that was a soundtrack of the movie Slumdog Millionnaire.
Post 1991 Urban/slum
Addis Abeba
The Report also states that EPRDF gave only limited attention to urban issues, and especially
so during the early and mid-1990s, owing partly to its preoccupation with the rural
development agenda. The preoccupation with Agricultural Development-Led
Industrialization (ADLI) seems to have been a factor behind initial government
reluctance to address some of the glaring problems of urban Ethiopia, such as
rising unemployment, deepening poverty, acute housing shortages, the fast deteriorating
conditions of kebele rental units and problems surrounding urban governance. The
multi-sector Ethiopian Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund (ESRDF),
which was established in1996, is a good case in point. Its aim is to improve
the well-being of the poor through support of community based projects most of
the projects so far have benefited people in rural rather than urban areas. By
comparison, the incidence of poverty has risen by 3.7 percentage points in
urban Ethiopia during the same period. Ethiopia has never had a comprehensive
national urban development policy until March 2005. As mentioned above, the
landmark in Derg urban development policies was Proclamation No. 47, which in
1975 nationalized urban land and rental housing. Nonetheless, with regard to land and housing, the new government’s
policy was very similar to that of the junta during its final days. There may
be no better evidence than the EPRDF’s decision to keep urban land as public
property, together with persistent ambivalence or indecision over privatization
of public housing. Perhaps the second most important policy decision made by
the EPRDF with regard to urban development was the urban land lease legislation
embodied in Proclamation No.3. in 1994. The main objective was not only to
adopt a market-oriented land and housing development system although land
remained government property. The government’s declared intention was also to
create a steady source of revenue for city authorities, so that they could use
leasehold-generated revenue to improve municipal services. Today, city
authorities are the sole suppliers of land and the government retains a high
degree of control over land use and design.
UNHABIAT(2006) states the
first meaningful policy measure that the Ethiopian government took in the 1960s
to address the problems posed by slum neighborhoods was razing slum houses in the
Tekle Haimanot area of inner Addis Ababa.
Overall, lack of adequate public participation both at the planning and
implementation stages was the major shortcoming of the Tekle Haimanot Upgrading
Project. It is important to bear in mind here that while the Derg was in power,
at least two types of cooperative housing programs were launched to improve the
housing conditions of urban low- and moderate-income households. They were then
known as the ‘Self-Help’ and ‘Pure Self-Help’ cooperatives.
In
post 1991 Ethiopia, the Addis Ababa city authority and prior to recent administrative
restructuring, neighborhood upgrading efforts had been significantly affected
by such factors as excessive centralism and the absence of a well-organized, dedicated
department that could effectively improve slums and manage squatter upgrading
programs. In 2004/2005 the Addis Ababa municipal authority launched a massive
urban renewal program in order to upgrade the inner parts of the city. The
scheme is known as the ‘condominium housing project; and the municipal unit in
charge is the Housing Development Project Office (HDO). Although the regime promised to build 200,000 houses within five years, so far only 81 thousand houses have been built. Condominum houses have been critiqued for being used as a political tools of serving only those that are members of the ruling party. The number of NGOs
currently involved in slum upgrading or environmental sanitation is not so
high. Several issues have considerably constrained the success of slum
upgrading programs in Addis Ababa in general; they have to do with gaps in
policy development, with institutional or organizational weaknesses that lead
to serious managerial, programming and operational shortcomings, and with
problems in project design, implementation and supervision. Lack of effective
coordination and experience sharing among the participating stakeholders has
also plagued slum improvement programs in Addis Ababa.
Addis
Abeba that has over 80% of its residnets living in the slum s doesn’t have a slum department within
the City Administartion or local districts. It would not be too expensive for the
municipality of Addis Ababa to create a particular department that has slum
improvement as its principal mission.
Improving Slums
Marshal (1966) explains that several
traditional approaches are developed to deal with the slum problem, including
charity measures, public and private services to slum dwellers, and slum
clearance.
Various
methods and policy approaches towards slum improvement
have been recommended: negligence, eviction, upgrading, resettlement, and
participatory slum improvement and are some of them.
Participatory slum improvement
In this form of slum improvement, the slum
residents take the first hand in the improvement of their areas with the
government taking the secondary role or participation (UNHABITAT, 2003). Marshal
(1966) says recognising the essential nature of most slum problems; this
approach involves developing greater community consciousness, participation in
a wider community, and self-help on the part of the slum dweller. Because the
approach takes the residents as first hand participants and implementers of the
programs with a sense of ownership, the improvement of slums becomes faster and
sustainable. Participatory slum development, whereby the slum
dwellers take a first hand in their local development, has been the most
effective so far.In any matter, slum improvement
approaches that take the residents, as first hand participants and owners are likely
to succeed.
Trenches of
revolutionaries
The
Ethiopian government and city admin should recognize slums as integral parts of
the urban fabric, especially as regards their role as main suppliers of shelter
for the urban poor and moderate-income households, recommended UNHABITAT’s
report. Based on this understanding to the government must advocate slum improvement
more than slum clearance. The latter should be allowed only in exceptional
situations and guided by clear and consistent regulations. Ethiopia or Addis Abeba is not the
glittering Bole and its shining complexes; it is the slums of Gedam Sefer,
Talayan Sefer, Merkato, Kera and so on. These are the secret holes that hide
and treat around four million of the Capital's populace. With the aim of “redeveloping”
Addis Abeba, the Meles Administration took slum upgrading measures. From the
slum improvement methodologies that this writer stated above four of the major
ones have been applied so far by the regime so far negligence, eviction, clearance and resettlement.
One method that has not been applied so far was participatory slum development.
This methodology would have solved most of the City's slum problems without
annoying many families and social capitals built through decades of mixture
and coexistence. The “new government” should consider this slum improvement mechanism.
One thing that the upcoming government of multicultural Ethiopian youth could
promise our compatriots in these slums of Adugenet should be thattheir slums would only be improved
via the Participatory Slum Improvement method.
As has been the experience in many other countries particularly in Egypt, slums
dwellers of Al-Me'adessa, home to 150 families, part of a 12
million-strong community of Egyptians living in the sprawling, unplanned slum
areas – known asashwa'iyat, have
been the galvanizing forces and embracers of the popular revolution that was spearheaded
by few intelligentsias such as WaelGohanim. The role of
Paris slum dwellers in the French Revolution with the inventory roles of the
brilliant minds, of the “Ancien Regime” has been undeniably recognised. Ethiopia’s
Gohanims (young activists) are now designing the popular revolution for Ethiopia that would come soon. However, without the participation and mobilization of Addis
Abeba’s slum dwellers (entrenched soldiers), the revolution could be futile. Addis
Abeba’s slums harbor the most poorest, neglected and marginalized part of
Ethiopia’s population who are the true pictures of today’s Ethiopia. My fellas
from the slums of Arat Kilo to the slums of Cherkos are highly frustrated with
the infuriatingly high cost of living and absence of freedom and democracy; they
are in need of some push and initiation that would mobilize them for a popular
revolution.
Let’s embrace and reach Addis Abeba’s slum dwellers now! This
is not via internet, telephone or mouth to mouth but via the third and best alternative.
Once the goal is achieved and the “new democratic government” takes power, Addis
Abeba’s slum dwellers ought to be its prime agenda of intervention. Addis Abeba’s slum dwellers make and
break the revolution not us.
References
Collins
English Dictionary (2007) Harper Collins Publishers, Great Britain
Dagron, G. (2001) Making Waves. New York:
Rockefeller Foundation
Davis M. (2006)Planet of Slums. Verso. London
Davis M. (2004)Planet of Slums Urban Involution and the Informal Proletariat,new left review 26
Drakakis-Smith,
D. (1981) Urbanisation, Housing and the Development Process, room Helm, London
PetroTrans, a Chinese oil and gas producer could conclude preliminary negotiations with Somaliland for the extension of the key port of Berbera by the end of this year, but has scrapped plans to build a liquefied natural gas facility.
Philip Hirschler, a legal adviser for PetroTrans, said from London the firm planned to extend Berbera port's container and mineral export services following an agreement it signed with the government of the breakaway enclave of Somalia last August. The Horn of Africa has been attracting increased investments in exploration by foreign oil firms, due to its proximity to east Africa, where oil has been discovered in Uganda and natural gas found in Tanzania.
The Hong Kong based company had planned to build gas pipelines from the field and at least two trains and LNG tankers for possible export of the product. "Some of the project that was initially proposed such as the LNG facility, could not go into Berbera because it would be impossible to get any insurance on the facility," Hirschler said. "We're still talking about (developing) a container port, a dry cargo port, and a mineral export port, once there's sufficient minerals development in Ethiopia or further west."
Ali Omer Mohamed, General Manager of Berbera port, told Reuters he expected the completion of preliminary negotiations with PetroTrans on Berbera's extension by the end of this year. "I expect studies, contracts and agreements to be finished this year," Mohamed said. PetroTrans signed four petroleum exploration and production sharing agreements with the Ethiopian Ministry of Mines in July 2011, paying $130 million for the rights to explore Blocks 3, 4, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17 and 20 in the Calub and Hilala Gas fields in the country's eastern Ogaden region.
Somaliland is an internationally unrecognised state that declared independence from Somalia in 1991, and hopes the deal will create thousands of jobs, raise its profile and attract more investments into the region. Hirschler said PetroTrans had approached neighbouring Djibouti on whether it could build an LNG facility there, but discussions were still in an early stage. Djibouti serves as a port for its landlocked neighbour Ethiopia.
Hirschler said PetroTrans was also negotiating with South Sudan's government to build an oil pipeline from South Sudan oilfields to the Port of Djibouti. South Sudan, which seceded from Sudan last year, said on Thursday it was considering building an oil pipeline through Ethiopia and Djibouti. South Sudan produces about 350,000 barrels of oil per day and exports via Sudan to a Red Sea port. Reuters
Ethiopia seems to feature more than any other African country in the charges of accommodating large land deals or land ‘grabs’ (choose depending on your bias) by foreign farming investors.
There is controversy about almost every aspect of them. Are the terms of the deals not too much in favor of the investors? What are those terms exactly? Will the host countries benefit much from them, or will they mostly be another type of resource plunder? How can Africa’s mostly communal land tenure systems be made compatible with commercial land leasing and ownership systems? Does the big new role of foreigners in answering that long outstanding question not create resentment and foster resistance to these deals?
Controversial as the deals may be, is it not necessary and unavoidable that at least some communal land gives way to high-intensity commercial use of one type or another? Has this not happened everywhere else in the course of ‘development?’ In respecting traditional communal land tenure indefinitely, would governments not actually be condemning many of their most vulnerable citizens to perpetual poverty, given declining soil fertility, increasing population pressures, climate unpredictability and so on; all factors that increasingly threaten the viability of rural life?
But then again, in countries where many have little else on which to sustain themselves except subsistence farming, is removing rural communities from their lands and livelihoods, no matter how basic, to make way for commercial farming not condemning them to an even more uncertain fate in new, unfamiliar territory?
These are just a few of the questions that face nearly all African countries, even those not currently in the news for ‘land grabs.’ These are issues that long preceded the current wave of land deals. None of the range of answers is as easy or straightforward as either supporters or opponents of the current deals would suggest.
Governments, investors and many others in between have often taken very simplistic positions on the land deals that leave out many of the complicated nuances. Media and various non-government organizations with their own rigid ideological or commercial interests at stake in supporting or opposing the land deals have only added to the confusion.
In making aggressive moves to develop a commercial agriculture sector, in many ways Ethiopia is going where Zimbabwe has been.
In certain media, any mention of Zimbabwe must automatically go hand in hand with phrases such as ‘Mugabe’s land grabs’ and the country ‘went from regional farming breadbasket to basket case.’ The idea is to emphasize the recent disruption of a system of title deeds-based farmland tenure that was long taken for granted, and a sophisticated, thriving commercial farming sector that was widely admired. ‘Mugabe’s land grabs’ from white farmers from about the year 2000 changed much of this. The country experienced several years of economic decline which it only arrested a few years ago, and is still battling to rise from.
As successful as the ‘breadbasket’ was, the considerable emotion that events in Zimbabwe elicit in a surprising number of people even far removed, means that there is little interest in going back a little in history to see the roots of the eventual dismantling of the land tenure system that gave rise to it. How did that commercial, Western-style farmland tenure system come about?
It came about in ways somewhat similar to what is being alleged the present Ethiopian government is doing in displacing rural communities to make way for foreign farm investors.
From the early 1900s, white settlers in the then Rhodesia were given by the colonial governments huge parcels of land from which Africans had been uprooted. The ‘villagization’ that the Ethiopian government is said/accused to be embarking on today sounds vaguely similar to the ‘tribal trust lands’ to which Africans were forcibly moved by colonial governments from the early days of Rhodesia.
In both cases, the main reason was to give prime land to the favored elite of the time, whether white settlers then in Rhodesia or investors in Ethiopia today. However, incidental benefits for the displaced communities were also cited as reasons why the land grabs would also benefit the dispossessed. In Rhodesia, it was said that the concentration of once widely scattered communities into fewer, smaller areas would make it easier for the colonial government to provide them various services, such as agricultural extension, schools and so on. In Ethiopia today, relocations which critics say are forced and violent, but which the government insists are voluntary, are explained as being to better enable access to schools, clinics and other basic social services.
Few of Rhodesia’s early white settlers had any farming experience at the time of getting land which had been grabbed from Africans. Many were rewarded with land for their role in African conquest, and some as thanks from then colonial power Britain for their service in Europe’s early 20thcentury civil wars.
Title deeds-based land tenure on the grabbed land replaced the traditional communal tenure system of the dispossessed Africans. It was on this grabbed land that successive colonial governments supported the new land holders to develop into the impressive commercial farming sector that powered Rhodesia’s economy, and later Zimbabwe’s.
From a distance and from outside, and for a while even in the country itself, all that appeared on the surface was the farming and economic success. Below the surface, the sense of grievance on which these successes were built was muted as long as the Africans enjoyed some of its crumbs, as farms workers or in the many downstream industries that resulted. But it never went away. It might have appeared as ancient history and finished colonial business for the then well-established descendants of the original white settlers, but it was a quietly present and continuing ‘issue’ for many Africans. The period from the colonial land grabs of the early 1900s to independence in 1980 was short enough that there were still many people alive who had personal memory of how they were chased from family lands, their cattle expropriated; forced labor and various new taxes forced on them. These stories were passed on from generation to generation in every African family.
The sense of African grievance that continued to fester over the land issue meant that all recognized the need for some type of land reform after 1980. One reason mostly polite discussion dragged on about the issue was the difficulty of how to raise the money to compensate the white land owners for any ceding of land to Africans they might agree to. In other words, the title deeds they held on land that had been grabbed from Africans several decades before were by most people seen as inviolate.
There was no talk, or very little, of invalidating the land deeds of black-ruled Zimbabwe because the land had been grabbed from Africans several decades before. It was sort of accepted that land reform negotiations would start on the basis and from the starting point of the colonial, title-based land tenure system, not the traditional African communal system that existed before that.
One of the reasons that ‘Mugabe’s land grabs’ have been so controversial, even emotional for many people, including those not directly involved, is that he invoked not the colonial title deed as the basis for land ownership legitimacy, but the land ownership rights of Africans before that; the ones that were grabbed from those Africans by the colonial governments. This was a very new post-colonial precedent that worries and outrages many people for all sorts of reasons not necessary to get into for the purpose of the present discussion.
Zimbabweans of all types were proud of their relatively developed, diversified economy and the ‘breadbasket’ commercial farming sector that underpinned it. All Zimbabweans suffered from the economic crisis that followed the recent land ‘re-grabs’ that were not well thought out. But it is interesting and important to note that there wasn’t/isn’t any significant African sentiment for those land re-grabs to be reversed. Most Zimbabweans want the land reform process and commercial agriculture fixed, but probably very few would advocate for the status quo to go back to the system of title deeds that originate in the area of colonial land grabbing.
If the old system of title deeds-based security of tenure is deemed illegitimate on the basis that they were issued on grabbed land, how is a new system of security of tenure to be built to give people the incentive to invest in land and ‘commercial’ farming again? Once today’s communal land has become a fully tradable commodity, how do poor rural farmers gain access to land and avoid being further marginalized by the few who can afford to buy it and acquire title deeds? Despite the increasingly apparent problems plaguing it, is Africa’s communal land tenure system really outdated and to be discarded, or does it still serve useful functions that no other system can fully do? Could the traditional communal system and a new title-based system co-exist in the same area?
There are many answers proffered, but none that are universally accepted or that address all the related historical, legal, cultural, political and economic issues easily.
It is easy to see the mess that this presents. For example, suppose you were a white farmer with a title deed in 2000 that lost his farm to the recent most recent ‘land grab.‘ What about if you had not inherited the land from an early 1900s British settler ancestor, but had bought it from the son or grandson of such a settler? Is ‘Mugabe’s land grab’ not clearly, obviously illegal and unfair to such a title holder? But what about if you were an African farm laborer on that same land, whose grandfather had been the early 1900s land holder from whom the land had been grabbed by the colonial government. It was then given, with title deed, to the white settler whose progeny then eventually sold the land and its title deed to today’s white farmer of my example.
Whose ‘ownership’ and whose ‘justice’ should prevail, and why?
If the colonial land tenure system was widely seen as unjust and illegitimate, clearly it is no longer possible or desirable to go back to the pre-colonial communal system, at least not on what had become ‘commercial’ farms. The people and times have largely changed. The need for that land to remain ‘commercially’ useful is recognized by all. Having demolished the system that existed for decades for its political/historical incorrectness, how do you build a new one that is politically correct while also giving land holders the room and incentive to invest and be productive? It is very far from straightforward.
To get back to today’s Ethiopian ‘land grabs,’ what is or isn’t happening in that country is from a distance very murky. It is almost impossible to accurately gauge the objectivity of the reports of those who slam or support the new land deals.
However, part of the lesson of Zimbabwe is that particularly in mostly agrarian societies, perceived ‘land grabs’ can set up a multiplicity of new problems decades after it appears they have been accepted as irreversible. Regardless of what impressive modern edifice is built upon land that there is majority consensus was unfairly ‘grabbed,’ especially in favor of ‘outsiders,’ there for a very long time will remain the explosive potential for conflict. All it needs is some small spark to set it off.
Leading Indian agro-investor in Ethiopia, rose grower/exporter Karuturi Global, has been perhaps the most prominent beneficiary of what many people say are the government’s ‘land grabs ’ from its citizens.
Sai Ramakrishna Karuturi, the company’s founder, dismisses the attacks. In a recent interview, he gave some of his perspectives on land and farming in his host country.
”Land is an emotive and contentious issue. Of the 300 million hectares of land we have, only one-third is arable. Africa is better in terms of productivity, costs, taxes, duty-free access to European markets because of their least developed country status. A rose from India, when it lands in Europe, will cost about 14 euro cents and it will be about 30% less from East Africa,“ said Karuturi.
Clearly he is a bold entrepreneur, and no doubt that alone rubs some people the wrong way. As he repeatedly points out, his company is doing nothing without the approval of the Ethiopian government. But if the investment is seen by many Ethiopians as being because of a closeness to the sitting government rather than as being of benefit to the country, Karuturi is inevitably breeding long-term local resentment in addition to roses.
As seen in Zimbabwe, the ‘security of tenure’ and economic success that is built on the mistreatment of the local people may not be as secure as it seems, even if the comeuppance is many decades later. If the political situation suddenly changes, land tenure based on a perceived crony relationship with the previous ruling political dispensation will be one of the first reforms to be conducted.
Karuturi has also been quoted as scoffing that many of the attacks on his and others’ land investments in Ethiopia and other African countries is by Western critics who have yet to come to terms with how China and India are displacing the West in many areas of engagement in Africa. While this cannot be dismissed entirely, Karuturi is ironically also making some of the same colonial - style moves that created long-standing resentment not only in Africa, but in his country India as well.
For example, it is quite likely that even for Ethiopians who basically support the investment thrust of their government and welcome the contributions of companies like Karuturi, the company’s widely publicized plan to bring in thousands of Indian tenant farmers to its Ethiopian holdings will be seen as a step too far. It suggests thinking and attitudes that are amazingly reminiscent of the origins of the complicated mix of land-related problems that plague Zimbabwe today.
In the land grabs from Africans of a century ago, the colonial governments obviously did not need to worry about the ‘public opinion’ of the dispossessed, disgruntled Africans. Today, no matter how autocratic a government may be, it is neither advisable nor entirely possible to ignore public sentiment. From a distance, in this regard the Ethiopian government seems to have contributed to the negative perception of the current land deals/grabs by poorly explaining them, and riding roughshod over critics. For both investors and host governments, these too are issues that may have an expensive belated political cost.
Zimbabwe is just one and perhaps the best known, most notorious example of the explosive potential of long unresolved land issues that Ethiopia could learn some lessons from on what to do and what not to do as it seeks to develop and ‘modernize’ its agriculture. It will be fascinating to watch how Ethiopia tackles the clash of land-related issues that have defied easy solution in many other African countries.
