- EU moves in
Map of the Horn of Africa
By De Birhan Media Team (http://www.debirhan.com/)
10-12-2011
Strategic
studies seem to be a Western take mostly. A friend wrote on a social media once
if Africa ever has gotten strategic analysts. We recall of one African man
appearing on Aljazeera as a strategic
analyst and giving his mumbo-jumbo – pro African Union, Pro Gadafi analysis during
the heydays of the Libyan crisis. The few strategic analysts of the Horn of
Africa we read were mostly Westerners or Orientals. De Birhan Media Team feels that the Horn of Africa/Ethiopia needs
strategic analysts who can dissect the strategic issues, plans, and objectives
of the region and beyond. The region simply wallows around international
strategic interests. Do oppositions
forces (Ethiopian) have strategists? The strategy that we are talking about is
of this type as defined by Wikipedia;
Strategic studies is an interdisciplinary academic field devoted to
topics concerning the relationship between politics, geography and natural resources, economics, and military power, such
as the role of intelligence, diplomacy and threats
in the preparation and use of force.
Although ignorant of
the study itself but thanks to the cyber world and libraries-, we flipped
through. Reading Harry
R. Yarger’s 2006 book “STRATEGIC THEORY FOR THE 21st CENTURY: THE LITTLE BOOK
ON BIG STRATEGY” offers a general theoretical definition of strategy,
Strategy
is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic,
social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with
policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests
relative to other states, actors, or circumstances. Strategy seeks a synergy
and symmetry of objectives, concepts, and resources to increase the probability
of policy success and the favourable consequences that follow from that
success. It is a process that seeks to apply a degree of rationality and
linearity to circumstances that may or may not be either. Strategy accomplishes
this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, ways, and means.
This broad and wide theoretical definition of strategy can be
applied to and by states, companies, political parties, opposition forces or
any other entity. As articulated in the strategic studies definition part,
there is no strategy without the interests of politics, geography, natural
resources, economics, military, and intelligence. In all its scopes, it
integrates these variables.
Harry summaries the following assumptions and premises of Strategy,
o
Strategy is proactive and anticipatory but not predictive.
Strategy seeks to promote or protect national interests as the future unfolds.
In doing this, it must consider change and make assumptions.
o
Strategy is subordinate to policy. Political purpose dominates
all levels of strategy.
o
Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the environment. Strategy must identify an appropriate
balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and
the resources available within the particular strategic environment. Strategy
must be consistent with the nature of the
strategic environment.
o
Strategic analysis highlights the internal and external factors
in the strategic environment that help define strategic effect and the specific
objectives, concepts, and resources of the strategy.
o
Strategy focuses on root purposes and causes. This focus makes strategy
inherently adaptable and flexible.
o
Risk is inherent to all strategy. Strategy is subordinate to the
uncertain nature of the strategic environment. Success is contingent on implementation of an effective strategy—ends,
ways, and means that positively interact with the strategic environment.
Failure is the inability to achieve one’s objectives, the thwarting of
achievement of one’s objectives by other actors or chance, or the creation of unintended adverse effects of such magnitude as to
negate what would otherwise be regarded a strategic success.
o The questions of suitability,
feasibility, and acceptability as expressed above are really questions
about the validity of the strategy, not risk. If the answer to any of the three
questions is “no,” the strategy is not valid. But strategy is not a black and
white world, and the strategist may find that the answer to one or more of
these questions is somewhat ambiguous.
The
Horn of Africa (HoA)
The
Horn of Africa is mostly defined as the countries belonging to the
Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) – Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda. Since the end of the cold war specifically
after 1991, international strategic, geopolitical interests in the Horn of
Africa had died out. The U.S. had enjoyed an unparalleled and sole hegemony
over the region. There was no resistance both from the inside
and outside. Countries of the Horn, the most poorest and turbulent region in
the world also enjoy some of the most despotic regimes and dictators give
priority to their funders and spinners than their own polities. They have lost
their national sovereignty just like their food sovereignty. Following the
paradigms of 2001 on the World Trade Centre and tensions between America and
some Muslim countries and terrorist groups that followed and majorly the rise
of the Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) economies has changed the
strategic and geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa. China’s economic interests and involvement in
the Horn surpasses all other nations with a strategic interest in the region.
The oil wealth, strategic location as a passage and contact between Europe and
Asia, its use as a strategic military base, the historical and religious embroidery
make the region an important place of international interest. Particularly, the
endless and transcending effects of the conflict in Somalia with the rise of
radical groups and maritime insecurity in the Indian Ocean heightened the
weight and precedence that was given to the region than any other geopolitical
region in the world.
EU Moves in
Although
the European Union has been present in the region in different forms and levels,
it has not been until last week that it has appointed a special representative
for the region to deal with the strategic concerns of the area. According to
the press release from the European Union Council published on 8 December 2011,
the Council appointed the Tanzania born Greece national, Mr Alexander Rondos as
EU Special Representative to the Horn of Africa.
The
press release stated,
The task of the Special Representative is to
actively contribute to regional and international efforts to achieve lasting
peace, security and development in the region comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia,
Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. The Council
has asked the Special Representative to initially focus on Somalia and
the regional dimensions of the conflict
there, as well as on piracy, which has its root causes in the instability of Somalia.
The
appointment of the Envoy comes a month after the adoption of EU’s Strategic
Framework for the Horn of Africa on 14 November 2011. The Strategic Framework for the Horn of
Africa states that the Strategic Framework to guide the EU’s engagement in the
region and states that the EU’s long-term commitment to the Horn of Africa is
rooted in the region’s geo-strategic importance, the EU’s desire to support the
welfare of the people. The Framework concludes that continued EU engagement
will be in support of both regional efforts, including through the
Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU),
and national efforts to achieve lasting peace, security, and justice, good
governance based on the democratic principles of inclusion, the rule of law and
respect for human rights. The Strategic Framework also recognises the need to
protect European citizens from the threats that emanate from some parts of the
region, including terrorism, piracy and the proliferation of the arms. It also
identifies a number of common challenges such as climate change and migration.
The
EU in this Strategic Framework commits to pursue a comprehensive approach paying
special attention to root causes and drivers of conflict, and to lagging
development in dealing with the issues of the Horn. EU
believes that the the region lacks a regional organisation effective enough to
mediate disputes and foster cooperation and advises for the development of the
capacities of Secretariat of AU and IGAD. It however, fails short of listing causes for
the lack of effective regional organisation.
After
the appointment of her special Representative to the Horn of Africa, Catherine
Ashton, European
Union's High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy commented: “The recent adoption of the strategic
framework for the Horn of Africa shows our determination to do all we can to
help achieve lasting peace, security, and development in the region. This is a
priority for the European Union."
In
general, the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa sets out five
priorities for EU action: building robust and accountable political structures;
contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats
emanating from the region; promoting economic growth, and supporting regional
economic cooperation (16858/11).
With
this old but updated and framed strategy, EU has joined the race for the Horn
of Africa. Although much of the content of the Strategy sounds to have been
designed with the aim of protecting EU’s interest from piracy and other
threats, it is eminently a strategy of hegemony. Like its counterparts, the EU
joined the race with an official strategy and representative whose mission is protecting
the strategic interests of the EU.
Iran
The Cutting Edge
on December 8, 2008 reported that Iranian ships and submarines had deployed an undisclosed
number of Iranian troops and weapons at the Eritrean port town of Assab,
according to opposition groups, foreign diplomats, and NGOs in the area. It also
had reported that Iran had sent soldiers and a large number of long-range and
ballistic missiles. “Using protection of the Eritrean refinery as a pretext,
Iran has set up its military operation there, and has been patrolling with
unmanned surveillance drones.” it said. According to Cutting Edge, opposition groups in Eritrea had been reporting that
President Isayas, with the cooperation of some Somali Islamist groups, was
going beyond mere bilateral oil supplies, and colluding to control the Bab El
Mandeb Straights in case of escalation of conflict with the United States and
Israel.
Trumpet.com reported on November 23, 2011 that Iran’s interest of
Islamising the whole region, particularly, Ethiopia. “Now that both Egypt and Libya are
moving into the Islamist camp, expect Iranian-backed radicals to make a move
for control of Ethiopia. Iran seeks to control the southern entrance to the Red
Sea. To do this, the regime in Tehran needs sympathetic Islamic governments
installed in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. This is what makes the Islamists
plotting against the current Ethiopian government so significant!”
Similarly, the Trumpet Weekly, on this week issue (Dec.4-10, 2011)
carried an article by Brad Macdonald entitled “Ethiopia in the crosshairs”.
Brad starts by saying “here’s
a blockbuster headline soon to come out of Ethiopia: Islamists gain control
of Ethiopia, Eritrea.” The writer fears that due to Ethiopia’s
strategic location and mainly Iranian influence, “Ethiopia is under
extreme pressure to come under the influence of radical Islam!”.
Like
the EU and other international powers, the interest of Iran in the Horn of
Africa is hegemony. It does not have a publicised strategic framework out yet,
however Iran has intensified its linkages and penetration in the Region.
Although most of the reports have stated
that Iran had formed a deeper linkage with most countries of the Region, its
relationship has been intentionally publicised as one of adversity by various
opinion media. The radicalising attempts have been unproven while some
Ethiopian Muslims complain of being forced to accept a different version of
Islam by the Ethiopian regime. The relations between the Ethiopian government
and Tehran remain cordial. Since the February 2009 meeting between the then Iranian foreign
minister, Manouchehr Mottaki and Prime Minister
Zenawi, and other Ethiopian ranking officials in order to promote Iranian economic and political
ties with Ethiopia and the region, “Ethiopian government and Iran have been recently discussing
on how to strengthen their bilateral relationship”. The regime of Meles Zenawi
while giving strategic bases, accepting aid and investments to/with America and
China, it is equally intensifying its symbiosis with Iran, according sources
close to De Birhan Media.
Jason
Warner on his October 12th, 2011 piece entitled Iran's troubled foray into Africa said , “Tehran has more recently been targeting
improved relations with other African states in the Horn of Africa – notably
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia – whose proximities to the Gulf of Aden
make them attractive to an Iran ever preoccupied with an adversarial Israel.”
And Arabs
The other grouping that has now come with an
intention of strategic linkage in the Horn has been the Arab world. In the
past few months, a group of Arab policy makers and scholars have been
discussing on how they could strengthen their strategic interests and role in
the Region.
A conference organized by the Institute of Arab Centre for Research and
Policy Studies (ACRPS) themed, "The Arabs and the Horn of Africa: the
dialectic of proximity and identity" and hosted by the Doha Institute from November 27 to 30,
2011, Arab experts stated that “The Horn of Africa is of paramount importance
to the Arab world, and special effort should be made to revitalize relations”.
It was also reported that, the speakers stressed the scale of benefits that could be
achieved by both Arab and Horn of Africa states by rectifying the deformities
afflicting their relationships due to the legacy of historical and political
factors, including the interference of great Western powers in the region. The conference discussed the political,
economic, strategic, and security facets of the relationship between the
Arabs and the Horn of Africa, in addition to the intellectual, cultural, and
social axis. The speakers also expressed their views on the rising ties
between Kenya and Israel and its impact on the Arab world.
The US
The US has been the longstanding
power with bases and established interest and involvement in the Region. The United States Africa Command, also known as
U.S. AFRICOM, one of nine Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD), has an office in Addis Abeba. Combined Joint Task Force –
Horn of Africa currently, CJTF-HOA
has been assigned a Combined Joint Operating Area (CJOA) that consists of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan. In
addition, the task force has an assigned Area of Interest (AOI) that consists
of Burundi, Chad, Comoros,
DemocraticRep.Congo , Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen. It conducts
operations in the Combined Joint Operations Area to enhance partner nation
capacity, promote regional stability, dissuade conflict, and protect US and
coalition interests. Read here more :
The Washington Post also reported on October 27, 2011 that the Obama
administration is building a constellation of secret drone bases in the Arabian Peninsula and the
Horn of Africa, including one site in Ethiopia. The Paper stated that the
Air Force confirmed that drone operations are underway at the Arba Minch
airport. Master Sgt. James Fisher, a spokesman for the 17th Air Force, which
oversees operations in Africa, said that an unspecified number of Air Force
personnel are working at the Ethiopian airfield “to provide operation and
technical support for our security assistance programs.”
The US has economic, aid, security,
and historical interests in the Region. Its strategic interest has been there
since the WWII. Its alliance shifted with the governments of the region and external
rival powers. As the rivalry for the strategic control of the region ensues, the
US has now to grapple with more powers that are intensifying their penetration
in the region such as BRIC countries, Iran and the EU.
China
The Centre for Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University
in South Africa published in November 2011 a paper titled “Competing for Development? The
European Union and China in Ethiopia.” It summarises that the EU has an
aid recipient relationship with strings attached while for China, Ethiopia is
an important economic and political ally in its Africa policy and China has
emerged as an alternative partner to the Ethiopian government, providing a
different development strategy and an alternative approach to economic and
political reform. The interparty relationships between the ruling Ethiopian
EPRDF party and the Chinese Communist Party of China (CPC) has reached its all time high. As the Ethiopian regimes attempts to be an ally
of both the West and Iran at the same time, it is also attracting Chinese involvement
in Ethiopian and regional strategic matters - triple standard.
Ambassador David H. Shinn in his
paper entitled “China and the Horn of Africa”, December 2011, concluded that China’s
recent engagement in the Horn has had both positive and negative consequences
from an American perspective. It has played pro West peaceful resolution,
peacekeeping and containing extremists influence and piracy in Sudan and
Somalia, positively. On the negative
side, China provided arms to Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea during their respective
wars, and unwillingness of governments in the region to pursue
democratization, better human rights practices, and efforts to rein in
corruption. China
and India have huge economic interest and concrete investments in the regions
oil, land, construction, education, and politico-military relations. The more
their wealth and resources are intricate with the Horn, the more strategic
interest these countries would have.
|
For more on China's involvement in Africa read Chris Alden’s “China’s growing role in
African peace and security “January 2011 book.
Conclusion
The cold war is back again in the
Horn of Africa. There is no proof than the above cases to put in plain words
the intensifying scamper of major economies to scramble the region and declare their
dominance. Although the conflict in Somalia, sanction of Eritrea and maritime insecurity
were being stated as the pretexts for the crowding of strategic powers in the
region, the main reason lies in the geopolitical importance of the location and
growing hostility between Iran and BRIC versus the West.
All failures
Diagnosing the aforementioned cases
and strategies against Harry’s theories of strategy informs that all the regional
strategies designed and interests are bound to failure. Majorly, being their inability
to include the peace and democracy loving citizens of the region and their representative
organisations into the strategic objectives or plans and consideration. Even
though, strategies are mainly about the national interests of the strategising
or executing nations, it is initially designed with objectives and plans that produce
the intended effect. In this case, most of the international actors that have strategic
interest in the Horn of Africa have in general missed the important unit in
their strategy: the larger public and their representatives. No strategy of the
above mentioned international actors mentions opposition groups or people of
the region as partners or parts of the objectives and plans.
Harry says Strategy is subordinate to the nature
of the environment. Strategy must identify an appropriate balance among the
objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, and the resources
available within the particular strategic environment. Strategy must be
consistent with the nature of the strategic environment. It is dependent upon
chaos and complex theories. As it is proactive and anticipatory, these
strategists must have been able to understand the regional complexities and
chaos. The nature of environment in strategies of the HoA even if unpredictable
like many other regions, can be anticipated- therefore, the strategy should
include the strong though fragmented opposition parties, civil societies, and
groups that represent the mass.
Harry also states
that success is contingent on implementation of an effective strategy—ends,
ways, and means that positively interact with the strategic environment.
Failure is the inability to achieve one’s objectives, the thwarting of
achievement of one’s objectives by other actors or chance, or the creation of
unintended adverse effects of such magnitude as to negate what would otherwise
be regarded a strategic success. The strategic objectives set by these
international actors are prone to failure for reasons that have not been
treated in the original design of the strategies.
The second reason for the failure of the strategies of these main actors is the fact that they are dealing with unelected, dictatorial and gunner governments. Dealing with undemocratic regimes leads and produces unceremonial outcomes to both all actors; “effective strategy—ends, ways, and means that positively interact with the strategic environment”. However, in the case of the HoA, the ends, ways, and means do not positively interact with the strategic environment.
The second reason for the failure of the strategies of these main actors is the fact that they are dealing with unelected, dictatorial and gunner governments. Dealing with undemocratic regimes leads and produces unceremonial outcomes to both all actors; “effective strategy—ends, ways, and means that positively interact with the strategic environment”. However, in the case of the HoA, the ends, ways, and means do not positively interact with the strategic environment.
The third and
possibly dangerous factor the dooms the failure of the strategies of the
international actors in the HoA region is the double alignment/standard of the governments
of the Horn. These nations and governments are in a deficit and negative position
to deal with these actors thus cannot play a partnership game but can only be submissive,
agent and servant to the powerful. Puppet regimes are thus ineffective. In
addition to being puppets, selling their sovereignty and status, the governments
of the HoA are aligning and being loyal to many international powers at the
same time. A good example is the Ethiopian regime that has formed and offered strategic
alliance with America, China, Iran, and the EU at the same time. During the
cold war period nations have stood with one of the two blocks, none stood with
two or more at the same time. Today, countries of the Horn of Africa have
aligned themselves with all international actors, receiving, strategic, and financial
assistance and blessing, protection to remain in power. Aware of these fact, international
actors strategically interested in the region have continued their alliance with
the weak and unreliable regimes of the Horn that want to step on three trees
with two legs. This trend poses a huge threat to the strategies set and could
even affect their long-term interests in the region- at the end, this brings
the collision and thwarting objectives the actors in play.
As read in the EU Strategic Framework, there is no envisaged strategy
of working with opposition forces and the larger public.
If strategy focuses on root causes, purposes, and learning from
experience and is sufficiently broad in its construction to adapt to unfolding events,
the strategy of EU and other international actors should proactively learn and anticipate
the apparent causes HoA’s problems and the solutions. If, as the strategies of
these actors says, their strategic interests doubled due to the rise of
extremists in Somalia, piracy and protecting and promoting stability in the
region, one basic strategy to have been included is finding comprehensive strategic
solution to the strategic problems of the region.
Peace, security, conflict prevention, and resolution are some of
the strategic approaches these international actors use to deal with the challenges
they face in the region. They do this by crippling opposition forces, organising
negotiations between the regimes and opposition forces that mostly served the interests
of the incumbents and at times infiltrating the privacies of opposition forces
in the region, blocking their media. As the result of this double standard of both the international actors
and governments in the region, no regime change occurred in the past 20 to 30
years. The presence and entrance of new international actors into the region
and the continuation of “aligning with all/loyal to all” strategy of governments
of HoA countries democratic transition or entrenchment and regime change may protract
to be wishes for decades to come. The strategies have been in general ill
researched and of short vision. International actors with strategic interests
in the HoA should revamp their existing pro-incumbent and selfish strategies; consult
with independent elites of the HoA and produce balanced, fair, and long-term
strategies.
“Suitability, feasibility, and acceptability” should yes be
cores of their new strategy.
