Sunday, October 23, 2011

Back from Amsterdam


By Ted, De Birhan Media Staffer
23 October  2011

Sorry folks for the disappearance without informing. I just got back from a few days trip in Amsterdam. Was so cool.  Enjoyed myself.
I went there with three motivez at hand:
  • ·         Enjoying myself or simply as a tourist
  • ·         Making linkages with the likes of mine- friends in similar fields
  • ·        Studying ways of kick starting a kind of media organisation that could be perhaps continental – this is not even at an incubation stage.

Therefore, I arrived in Amsterdam on Thursday the 20th October 2011. Finding a bed was one of the first and hardest things to do. I went to one of the hotels in the Amsterdam Central area and I was asked to pay €289, as most Ethiopians would say when they find things expensive, I also said, “Maybe I will come later” and headed to Dam, older part of Amsterdam where youth hostels are found. I bumped to a man who wore a tattered cloth and said when he saw me “Ethiopia or Somalia?” in an inquisitive voice.  “Ethiopia” I replied.  “You” I asked. “I am from Aruba”, he answers. Never heard of that country but this is what I found on Wiki about that country.

Aruba is a 33 km-long island of the Lesser Antilles in the southern Caribbean Sea, located 27 km north of the coast of Venezuela and 130 km (aprox.) east of Guajira Peninsula (Colombia). Together with Bonaire and Curaçao, it forms a group referred to as the ABC islands of the Leeward Antilles, the southern island chain of the Lesser Antilles.As one of the four constituent countries that form the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with the Netherlands, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten whose citizens share a single nationality: Dutch citizen.

He promised to take me to the cheapest Hostel, shared one, in Dam area if I help him with few cents. I got in one of the shared rooms –four beds in a small room. In the reception area, while checking in my room two people who claimed to be Italians asked the receptionist that he send them to the room that Europeans tourists are in. The receptionist said that he could not do that, as most of the rooms are fully booked. These two lads and I ended up in the same room finally.
I used the next day to tour and play games in the city played games near the Dam Square. Just a distance from the square there, were few protesters domiciling in tents and giving leaflets on the “Occupy New York” and economic crisis.  



I later on went to visit Red Light District literally the legalised Sebategna and Kazainchis of Amsterdam. At dusk, headed to eat my dinner at an Ethiopian Restaurant, Addis Abeba Restaurant, in the heart of Amsterdam. Delicious food and remarkable service really. There continued talking to some Ethiopian men I met. It stuns me what we always rush to know the political side of our counterparts in dialogues. We just wanna label them always. I was not easy for the man to unravel for  most of his efforts, he tried to know whether I was an opposition or supporter of the ruling regime. I returned to this same Restaurant the next day (yesterday); three new Ethiopian men came to eat, who sounded so political and talked about the Arab revolutions and so on. They tried to eavesdrop what I was saying on the other table to. I finally thanked the owner of the Restaurant for the greatest hospitality and service and left.
In this trip, I also met another important person whom I always wanted to meet in person. This important Ethiopian man came with his daughter and spent good part of his time minding his playful daughter and listening to my endless talk. This was the interesting part of my journey, I feel I was isolated a bit and wasted my tiny skills alone. I know many skilful Ethiopians dispersed all over the world, working in proletarian jobs. Had there been one International Association of Ethiopians that works to defend the rights and interests of Ethiopians, many of us would have found safety or would have realised our envisioned ideas walked. To do so, wonders or at least do something effective finding ones types or forming networks/ contacts is essential.
That will come.
Save some money and go visit Amsterdam!!! 

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Security Council to consider new Eritrea sanctions


Posted by AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE on October 18, 2011


UNITED NATIONS, Oct 18 – The Security Council will begin Tuesday discussing a draft resolution on imposing new sanctions on Eritrea for what a UN report describes as destabilizing actions in East Africa.
Neighbor and long-time rival Ethiopia has sought reinforced international sanctions since a UN panel in July said Eritrea was behind a plot to stage bomb attacks on an African Union summit in Addis Ababa in January.
The additional sanctions being considered included targeted measures against investment in the country’s mining industry as well as further asset freezes and travel bans on the Eritrean leadership.
The United States threw its weight behind Ethiopia’s call for new sanctions in August after the UN group that monitors sanctions said Eritrea was behind the bombing plot.
The UN experts also said Eritrea was arming and supporting insurgent groups in Somalia, including the Al-Qaeda-linked Shebab.
The Security Council imposed in December 2009 an arms embargo, travel restrictions and asset freeze on top Eritrean political and military leaders because of alleged support for the Islamist Shebab militants.
Eritrea has, however, accused its neighbor of staging a “frenzied campaign” for sanctions and says any measures enforced by the UN would hurt the Eritrean people most of all.
A six-nation East African regional group, the Inter-Government Authority on Development, has called for sanctions against mining interests and banning a government tax on remittances sent back by Eritreans living abroad.

Sunday, October 16, 2011

Ethiopia in Howard’s Book : The Digital Origins Of Dictatorship And Democracy: Information Technology And Political Islam


By T, Staffer of De Birhan Media
17-10-2011

This is a timely book written in the high time of the Arab Springs. It is a resourceful study of the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on the democratic and political situation of countries with large Muslim communities.
I have skimmed the book.
Howard analyzes the ways in which ICTs contribute to democratic entrenchment or transition in countries with large Muslim communities, Ethiopia being one of them. To do so, he evaluates ICT use and democratic change in 75 countries with Muslim communities from 1994 to 2010. He argues that the revolution in the Middle East will be digitalized, meaning that transitions will no longer occur without the necessary digital tools.  In his analysis, he searches for the ingredients of the modern recipe for democratic transition or democratic entrenchment.  As to Howard, new technologies become a fundamental infrastructure for journalists and civil society groups; they are a necessary but not sufficient causal condition for contemporary regime change. I will deal on these and issues related to political Islam issues in the future piece. This book has six chapters. Chapter 1 offers a conceptual framework and some useful indicators for studying diffusion and political institutions.
Chapter 2 deals with ICT policies and lineages of the digital state. Chapter 3 focuses on political parties' online presence. Parties in countries with Muslim communities have benefited from lower prices for branded addresses and hosting services and could rapidly catch up with other non-developed countries in establishing websites.
The use of ICTs has also an impact on journalism and media landscapes (chapter 4). People can participate as “citizen journalists” in cultural production by blogging and posting videos or photos. They disseminate information on human rights violations, which cannot go unnoticed any more
Chapter 5 - Civil society is often defined by its independence from the state. Civil society groups need media beyond state control and as such, they have benefited a lot from ICTs.
The last descriptive chapter is dedicated to censorship and the production of a political culture. For Howard, political culture “refers to ideological frames that help filter information”. The production of a political culture has significantly grown due to the spread of ICTs in countries with important Muslim communities.
Among the results of his analysis, Howard lists the solutions with the highest consistency and coverage: For democratic transitions, having a comparatively active online civil society is the most important ingredient of both necessary and sufficient solutions. In small countries and countries with a well-educated population, this active online civil society is even sufficient for democratic transitions. For democratic entrenchment, a well-developed information infrastructure is important, while it is crucial that the country's economy is not dominated by fuel exports.
Howard's book provides ample evidence for the importance of ICTs in democratic transitions and points to the possibilities of supporting democratic transitions by discouraging the export of censorship software or by making reforms of information structure a condition for loans from the international lending community.
 Ethiopia as a case in his Book

From the Horn of African countries Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia in all the assessments have been sectioned in the Authoritarian list.  Kenya and Djibouti were in the Transition list and Somalia was in the Crisis.
He says in Authoritarian regimes the competition for political positional is restricted by political elites, chief executives are chosen through a recognized process within a small community of power brokers, and there are few constitutional checks on the executive branch. Autocratic regimes sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation; there are few institutionalized constraints on the ruling elites and often these ruling political elites exercise control over cultural and economic activity. Among dictatorships, the executive branch is prioritized for ICT resources. Justice and Revenue authorities get limited investments, largely because state capacity and transparency in these domains is anathema to the ruling elite.

Table 2.2 p.68 and 69 - Government Offices Online in the Muslim World, 2008

Ethiopia as sectioned in the authoritarian list has its Revenue Website hosted in-country. The Executive branches existence online was not found. The Legislature was found but not hosted in-country. Similarly, the Foreign Affairs and Justice Government Offices were also found but not hosted in-country. And E-Government Services were indicated as Poor.
Comparatively, Somalia, which is sectioned under Crisis state, its Executive and Legislature had an Online Presence though hosted outside the country. Eritrea had none of its Government Offices found Online. Its E-Government Presence was also poor like Somalia and Ethiopia. 

Table 2.3 P. 68 and 69 - Outcomes –Remittances, ICT –led Growth and State Capacity, 2010 

In Ethiopia, a remittance given per capita in 2007 was eight. ICT-led growth given as exports of computer and information services in millions of US dollars in 2003 was zero in the case of Ethiopia. State capacity was modest in 2007 while it was improving between 2000 and 2010.

Table 3.3 p. 98-99 Outcomes – Information Infrastructure for Political Parties, 2000-2008

Number of online Parties and All Political Parties, 2000 were 1 and 26 in Ethiopia. The number of Online Parties and All Political Parties, 2005 in Ethiopia were 3 and 24. The Number of online parties hosted in country/number of online parties/ all political parties, 2008 was 0, 6 and 10. The volume of content provided by political parties for citizens is indicated as moderate in 2008.

Table 4.3 Page 124 and 125 State Ownership and Online Journalism, 2007 -2010

The State Media Market Share or State Dominance in media markets through direct ownership or indirect organizational control in Ethiopia within the period was High. Number of Online News Sites 3 and Daily Newspapers were also three. Number of Online News Sites Hosted In-Country was zero and the number of online news sites was three. The importance of the online news sphere was low.

Table 5.1 Page 138-39 Civil Society Online

Size and Growth of Civil Society Online/ Size of online population calculated as proportion of national online in 2007, and indicated as Medium and growth of online population calculated as the annual rate of growth in the internet population from the year 2000 to 2007 was in Rapid growth.
The online library infrastructure of the five largest government, private or other public libraries was evaluated as None , similar was the case in Eritrea.

Table 6.1.P 176 and 177: Censorship and the Production of Political Culture, 2003-2008

The Digital cultural production relative to internet user population small in Ethiopia. Internet Monitoring and restrictions was described as Unrestricted. Social filtering was Selective. Political Filtering was Substantial. Conflict/Security filtering was selective. Internet tool filtering was selective.

Table A.3: Page 212 Proportion of Population Practicing Islam, Degree of ICT Diffusion, and countries that remained Authoritarian

Ethiopia has Muslim Population – Small and the Technology Diffusion was slow. The Authoritarian Status of EthiopiaRemained Authoritarian. However, Howard says Ethiopia consistently scored +1 in Polity IV over the period of study, but in the author’s judgment this country is not in the set of transition or entrenchment countries. Eritrea had a moderate technological diffusion. Stunningly, Somalia, a crisis state had a rapid growth rate of technological diffusion.  For countries such as Benin, Eritrea, and Gambia, technology diffusion has not been particularly rapid and democratization movements in these countries have had little success.
Writing about censoring and surveiling political culture online, He says Ethiopia, Pakistan, Syria, and Uzbekistan have similar strategies for obstructing access to locally produced content while leaving access to international websites fairly unrestricted.                 


Philip N. Howard. 
The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Page 285

ISBN 978-0-19-973641-6;

$24.95 (paper)

ISBN 978-0-19-973642-3

You read the rest…                                                                                                                                                                                                   









Friday, October 14, 2011

News in brief : Abadula Gemeda ostracized by OPDO

Relationship Between Democracy Support and Development Aid

 This is an old but important file from  From carnegieendowment.org

Thomas Carothers, Scott Hubli, Brian Levy, Marc F. PlattnerTHURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2010 – WASHINGTON, D.C.






Once separate, the arenas of democracy support and development aid have become increasingly interconnected in recent years. Cooperation between the two communities, however, remains uneven at best. To assess the evolution and implications of this critical relationship, the Journal of Democracy published a set of articles on the topic in its October 2010 issue. The Journal of Democracy and the Carnegie Endowment co-sponsored a panel discussion with the primary author of this series, Carnegie’s Thomas Carothers, and the authors of the two response articles, Brian Levy of the World Bank and Scott Hubli of the National Democratic Institute (who co-authored his essay with Ken Wollack, also of the National Democratic Institute). 

Toward Convergence

Carothers traced the growing overlap and interconnections that have occurred between democracy aid and development aid over the past two decades.
  • Common priorities: In the 1990s Western donors embraced the idea that democracy and development can complement each other. The two practitioner communities recognized that they share common priorities, such as the rule of law and the creation of a strong middle class, Levy noted.

  • Taking politics into account: Developmentalists who once shunned political involvement began acknowledging the role of good governance in advancing economic development, Carothers said. The focus on good governance gradually moved beyond mere efficiency to more politically normative goals such as enhancing the accountability, transparency, and responsiveness of governing institutions.

  • Helping democracy deliver: In the same years the democracy community shifted its emphasis from helping democratic breakthroughs occurs to strengthening fledging democratic governments emerging from such breakthroughs.  This shift also involved attention to governing institutions and began touching on socioeconomic issues, Carothers explained. Reflecting the concern that new democracies may fail if they do not meet the socioeconomic demands of their citizens, in 2005 the National Democratic Institute launched a “Helping Democracy Deliver” initiative.

  • Institutional integration: These shifts by the two communities led them to work on similar sectors and toward increasingly similar objectives. Some major development aid agencies began incorporating democracy elements into their work. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) has gone far to fuse the two domains, defining poverty as comprising not just socioeconomic deprivation but an absence of political freedom as well, a move praised by Hubli.

Continuing Divisions

Despite this evolution, serious differences remain between development and democracy promotion communities.
  • Diminishing consensus: While the development community has accepted the need to consider politics in its programmatic thinking and action it is not convinced about the utility of democracy for development, Carothers argued. For instance, China’s rapid economic growth under an authoritarian government has provided an alternative development model and increased skepticism in many quarters about democracy’s relevance for development.

  • Persistent stereotypes: Hubli noted that stereotypes continue to inhibit dialogue between democracy and development communities. For instance, development practitioners often assume democracy advocates are primarily engaged in promoting revolutionary change, when in fact much democracy work concerns gradual institution building.

  • Country ownership: Development organizations work primarily with domestic governments and are wary of injecting politics into the development equation out of fear it may endanger their relationships with key decision makers, Carothers noted. The democracy community, on the other hand, is often challenging to host governments and questions the legitimacy of authoritarian governments claiming to speak for their country, Hubli said.

  • Consider the consequences: Development programs have the potential to harm democracy by legitimizing authoritarian governments. Hubli argued that development experts need to do more to consider the possible negative consequences of their programs and ensure they are not strengthening anti-democratic actors.

  • Moving from good ideas to programs: Even when democracy and development practitioners take into account each other’s concerns in overall assessments and objectives, these issues are often not jointly addressed at the project level, Hubli added.

An Evolutionary Approach

Levy warned against creating a binary division between democracy and development, and urged a more fluid approach to the common end-goal of high incomes and open societies.
  • Divergent paths: Countries begin at different starting points, and follow many different paths toward the end goal of strong middle classes, a robust private sector, and democratic institutions, Levy contended.

  • Work with the grain: Given these different paths, Levy suggested international aid agencies should focus on available opportunities to nudge countries toward political reform rather than push for immediate democratization. For instance, in some situations strengthening government institutions will be a priority while in other cases it is unlikely to be effective.

  • Social accountability: Levy said the development community has embraced the idea of increasing local participation rather than focusing only on high-level institutional reform. This change will improve the ability of communities to push for accountability, although members of the audience questioned how useful it is to increase civil society capacity if state institutions are closed and unresponsive.

  • How long will we wait for democracy? Carothers asked how patient the development community will be in the face of authoritarian governments that are not moving toward increased openness. Levy responded that, given the record of greater political success in wealthier developing countries, he would be more proactive in pushing for democratic reform in middle-income countries than in low-income settings.

Is Synthesis Desirable?

  • Uneasy and unequal: Carothers described integration between democracy and development communities as an uneasy and unequal convergence. The democracy community is wary of getting lost in the larger pool of development aid. On their end, the development community still questions the value of democracy for development even while embracing governance goals that converge closely with democratic ones.

  • Different specialties: Democracy and development programs have different comparative advantages, Hubli noted. For instance, democracy aid has a significant role to play in some middle-income countries where development agencies are less needed.

  • Trade-offs: Audience members pointed out that there can be real trade-offs between democratic representation and development efficiency, even if neither side wants to speak openly about such trade-offs. For instance, Iraq’s political system is open to participation from a wide variety of groups, but this has not led to political stability or solid institution building.


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